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THE DISPROPORTIONATE EFFECT ON NATIVE
AMERICAN WOMEN OF EXTENDING THE FEDERAL
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER ACT TO INCLUDE A
WOMAN’S CONDUCT AGAINST HER CHILD IN UTERO:
UNITED STATES v. FLUTE
Andie B. Netherland*
I raise up my voice—not so that I can shout, but so that those
without a voice can be heard . . . . We cannot all succeed when
half of us are held back.
—Malala Yousafzai
I. Introduction
Samantha Flute, a Native American woman, was charged with
committing involuntary manslaughter against her newborn baby boy after it
was revealed that she took over-the-counter and prescription drugs shortly
before delivery. 1 Although the District Court for the District of South
Dakota dismissed the charges, the Eighth Circuit found that the Federal
Involuntary Manslaughter Act (FIMA) included a woman’s prenatal actions
that caused the death of her born-alive child.2 Flute’s case is one of first
impression as these actions and particular circumstances have never before
constituted involuntary manslaughter at the federal level. 3
This Note will explore the Eighth Circuit’s holding to determine whether
the FIMA should be extended to cover actions, such as Flute’s, which result
in the death of a newborn child. Additionally, this Note will explore how
the Flute holding, as it stands, disproportionately affects Native American
women compared to the rest of the population. Considerations such as
culture and healthcare will demonstrate that, under the holding in Flute,
Native American women face further oppression. Part II of this Note lays
out the pertinent legal history of federal jurisdiction over Native Americans.
In Part III, this Note summarizes the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Flute. Finally, Part IV interprets the FIMA as it should be applied

*
1.
2.
3.

Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584, 585–86 (8th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 589.
Id. at 591 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
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in this situation and further analyzes the effect of the Flute holding on
Native American women.
II. A Perfect Storm: The Statutory Basis for Flute’s Conviction
A. Federal Jurisdiction
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1153, known as the Major Crimes Act, in
1885.4 The Act was adopted in response to the decision in Ex parte Crow
Dog, where an Indian-against-Indian murder conviction prosecuted under
the General Crimes Act was overturned due to the Indian-against-Indian
exception of the General Crimes Act. 5 Conversely, the Major Crimes Act
sought to confer criminal jurisdiction to the United States over serious
crimes that “might otherwise go unpunished under [the] tribal criminal
justice system[].”6 As a result, the Major Crimes Act now federally
criminalizes a list of enumerated crimes committed by one Indian against
another Indian. 7 The Major Crimes Act provides that “[a]ny Indian who
commits against . . . another Indian . . . any of the following offenses . . .
within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as
all other persons committing . . . the above offenses, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.”8
Flute’s actions, if considered to be involuntary manslaughter, fall within
the purview of the Major Crimes Act; Flute and her baby, the victim of the
crime, are Native American. 9 Additionally, Flute committed the act in
Agency village, which is within Indian Country.10 Thus, because the
conduct falls within the domain of the Major Crimes Act and occurred
between tribal members, the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over
Flute. 11

4. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
5. CONF. OF W. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 4:9 (2020 ed.),
AILDKBK § 4:9 (Westlaw) [hereinafter DESKBOOK] (citing Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S.
556 (1883)).
6. United States v. Other Medicine, 596 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2010).
7. DESKBOOK, supra note 5; 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
9. Redacted Indictment, United States v. Flute, No. 1:17-CR-10017-CBK, 2017 WL
5495170 (D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019).
10. Id.
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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B. Involuntary Manslaughter
Flute was indicted for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112,
the FIMA. 12 The FIMA defines involuntary manslaughter as “the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice . . . [i]n the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution . . . of a lawful act which might produce
death.”13 The prosecution believed that Flute’s actions fell within this
definition and a grand jury returned an indictment under the Act. 14
The United States alleged that Flute “unlawfully killed a human being,
Baby [] Flute, without malice, in the commission of a lawful act in an
unlawful manner which might produce death.”15 Involuntary manslaughter
caused by negligence has been interpreted to mean a “wanton or reckless
disregard for human life.” 16 To be characterized as involuntary, this
negligent killing must be unintentional and must not be of such a reckless
disregard for human life that it would “support a finding of malice.” 17
Additionally, to support a conviction under the Act, the prosecution must
prove the responsible party “had actual knowledge that [the] conduct was a
threat to the lives of others, or to have knowledge of such circumstances as
could . . . have made foreseeable . . . the peril to which [the] acts might
subject others.”18 Neither the intent nor the malice of the defendant is
considered a factor needed to establish involuntary manslaughter.19
Flute did not believe her conduct fit within the requisite elements of the
FIMA; therefore, she moved to dismiss the charges after her indictment. 20
Flute contended that, in reading the involuntary manslaughter statute,
neither the class of victims protected nor the class of defendants sought to
be criminalized includes mothers and newborn children injured in utero. 21
Rather, the Act only mentions that “victims” refers to human beings who
are unlawfully killed. 22 The definition of “human being” in reference to
12. Redacted Indictment, supra note 9.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a).
14. Redacted Indictment, supra note 9.
15. Id.
16. United States v. Blount, 514 F. App’x 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2013).
17. United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v.
Lesina, 833 F.2d 156, 159 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. United States v. Pardee, 368 F.2d 368, 374 (4th Cir. 1966).
19. Id. at 373.
20. United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 2019).
21. Id. at 586.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a).
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infants is set out in 1 U.S.C. § 8, the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act
(BAIPA), which applies broadly to all acts of Congress.23 Moreover, the
BAIPA does not set out any specific exception for actions of mothers when
the victim is their own child. 24 The broad implications of the BAIPA create
ambiguities when considering the BAIPA in conjunction with other acts
like the FIMA, as in this case. In light of this, statutory interpretation
determines whether Flute’s conduct meets all of the requisite elements of
the federal involuntary manslaughter offense.
C. Healthcare in Indian Country
Historically, the federal government has recognized an obligation to
provide healthcare to Native Americans as a result of treaties and
agreements between the government and Native tribes throughout the
country.25 As early as the nineteenth century, the United States began to
provide “modest provisions for health care” for Native Americans in an
effort to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. 26 In 1921, Congress
enacted 25 U.S.C. § 13, known as the Snyder Act, which authorized the
federal government to fund and enact various Indian programs for purposes
such as “relief of distress and conservation of health.” 27 This Act authorized
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to expend only for the named purposes
and provided that “Congress may from time to time appropriate, for . . .
assistance of the Indians throughout the United States” instead of
guaranteeing any specific service to Native Americans.28 The Snyder Act’s
vague authorization of funds resulted in inconsistent and meager federally
provided healthcare for Native Americans.29 This continued until the 1950s
23. 1 U.S.C. § 8. This Act provides that for any Act of Congress that uses the words
“‘person’, ‘human being’, ‘child’, and ‘individual’,” the meaning of such words includes
“every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of
development.” Id.
24. See id.
25. Koral E. Fusselman, Note, Native American Health Care: Is the Indian Health Care
Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2009 Enough to Address Persistent Health
Problems Within the Native American Community?, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 389, 394 (2012).
26. Betty Pfefferbaum et al., Learning How to Heal: An Analysis of the History, Policy,
and Framework of Indian Health Care, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365, 368–69 (1996).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 13; see also Fusselman, supra note 25, at 395.
28. 25 U.S.C. § 13.
29. See Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 26, at 376–77, 386; see Fusselman, supra note 25,
at 395 (“[T]he Act failed to define specific programs for assistance and eligibility
requirements, and did not represent a general entitlement to services.”).
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when new legislation transferred the responsibility of Indian medical
services from the BIA to the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, which is now known as the Department of Health and Human
Services. 30
Despite this change in responsibility, there remained a severe need for
healthcare improvements as the “health status of Native Americans was far
below that of the general population.” 31 In 1976, the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act sought to improve the health of Native Americans by
implementing various health programs and services. 32 The Act specifically
recognized that the United States has a “special responsibilit[y] and legal
obligation to the American Indian people, to meet the national goal of
providing the highest possible health status to Indians and to provide
existing Indian health services with all resources necessary.”33
Since the enactment of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, there
has been an expansion in healthcare programs and healthcare access for
Native Americans, but problems and shortfalls of the Indian Health Service
still remain.34 One shortfall is the fact that Native Americans are subject to
limitations as a result of the control the federal government has over the
Indian Health Service. Despite the recognition that healthcare for Native
Americans is a historical obligation of the federal government, Native
American healthcare is subject to the same congressional limitations as
government-provided healthcare. 35 In particular, Native American women
may not receive abortions through the Indian Health Service, due to the
enactment of the Hyde Amendment, just as women receiving Medicaid may
not.
30. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 395; Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 26, at 382.
31. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 396.
32. Id.; Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 3, 90 Stat. 1400,
1401 (1976) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1602).
33. Indian Health Care Improvement Act § 3, 90 Stat. at 1401.
34. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 407 (explaining the shortage of health professionals on
reservations and the Indian Health Service’s failure to “adequately address the health needs
of local Native Americans.”).
35. Congress has restricted the use of federal funds for abortions by the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Indian Health Service. Infra note 45 and accompanying
text. As the Department of Health and Human Services is the funding mechanism for
Medicare and Medicaid, government-provided healthcare likewise does not cover abortions.
How is Medicare funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-ismedicare-funded#:~:text=The%20Centers%20for%20Medicare%20%26%20Medicaid,and
%20Human%20Services%20(HHS).&text=This%20money%20comes%20from%20the%20
Medicare%20Trust%20Funds (last visited Dec 2, 2020).
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D. The Hyde Amendment
In 1976, the Hyde Amendment was added to the annual Health and
Human Services Appropriations Bill.36 The original Amendment provided
that no funds appropriated to the Department of Health could be “used to
perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to term.”37 Subsequently, Congress broadened the
Hyde Amendment to include an exception allowing for the use of federal
funds for abortions when “necessary for the victims of rape or incest” or
“the termination of an ectopic pregnancy.” 38 Despite challenges to the Hyde
Amendment in consideration of the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court, in Harris v. McRae,
held the Hyde Amendment to be constitutional in accordance with the Fifth
Amendment.39 Today, the Hyde Amendment still stands for the same
proposition: federally allocated funds may not be used for abortions, except
in the narrow circumstances of rape, incest, ectopic pregnancy, or other
instances where the mother’s life is endangered. 40
Since the Hyde Amendment was specifically targeted at cutting off the
federal funding of abortions for women on Medicaid, 41 it did not affect
Native American women until later on. It was not until 2008 that the Senate
realized there was a loophole in the Hyde Amendment caused by its
intersection with the funding mechanism for the Indian Health Service.
Because the Hyde Amendment provided that “[n]one of the funds contained
in [the] Act” could be used for abortions, the Amendment did not apply, at
that time, to the funds allocated to the Indian Health Service through a
different act.42 In 2008, the Senate proposed an amendment to the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act extending the Hyde Amendment’s
application to the Indian Health Service as well. 43
The Senate approved the Indian Health Care Improvement Act’s
amendment and, shortly thereafter, added a provision that limited the use of
36. Senate Moves to Bar Abortion Funding from Indian Health Care Bill, 15 Andrews
Health L. Litig. Rep. (West) No. 11, at 10, 10, 2008 WL 780623 at *1 (Mar. 26, 2008).
37. Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill, Pub. L. No. 94-439, sec. 209, 90
Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
38. Act of Oct. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-369, sec. 110, 94 Stat. 1351, 1356 (providing
continuing appropriations for the fiscal year of 1981).
39. 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980).
40. Act of Oct. 1, 1980 sec. 110, 94 Stat. at 1356.
41. Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill sec. 209, 90 Stat. at 1434.
42. Id.
43. Senate Moves to Bar Abortion Funding from Indian Health Care Bill, supra note 36.
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funds by the Indian Health Service to the Indian Health Care Improvement
Act. 44 The new amendment provided that any limitations contained in “an
Act providing appropriations for the Department of Health and Human
Services . . . with respect to the performance of abortions shall apply . . .
with respect to . . . using funds contained in an Act providing appropriations
for the Indian Health Service.” 45
These various pieces of legislation play an important role in Flute’s
conviction of federal involuntary manslaughter, discussed in Part IV(B) of
this Note. The Major Crimes Act and the FIMA are the Eighth Circuit’s
basis for convicting Flute. The legislation surrounding Indian healthcare
and the Hyde Amendment are relevant to the proposition that Native
American women are disproportionately affected by the Eighth Circuit’s
holding in Flute. This legislation created the “perfect storm” for defendant
Flute.
III. The Case: United States v. Flute
Flute gave birth to a baby boy on August 19, 2016 at a hospital in
Sisseton, South Dakota.46 Baby Flute was born full-term at thirty-eight
weeks; he was seemingly healthy “with no obvious signs of trauma or
injury.”47 Despite this fact, Baby Flute died four hours after birth. 48 While
efforts were made to resuscitate Baby Flute, the mother admitted to abusing
several over-the-counter and prescription drugs immediately prior to her
admission to the hospital for Baby Flute’s delivery.49 Specifically, Flute
told the doctors she: (1) took “three times the daily dose of Lorazepam,” a
drug prescribed to her during a prenatal medical visit; (2) snorted
hydrocodone, which she believed was laced with cocaine due to the feeling
it gave her; and (3) drank cough medicine. 50
When Flute was initially admitted for delivery, lab results indicated she
tested positive for “cocaine and a number of prescription and over-thecounter drugs.”51 Additionally, Flute admitted she was aware that ingesting
these substances could hurt Baby Flute, but did so anyway because “she

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
25 U.S.C. § 1676.
United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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needed to get high.”52 Baby Flute’s autopsy confirmed the presence of
substances that had not been administered to him during the time he was
alive at the hospital.53 The pathologist who conducted the autopsy
concluded that Baby Flute died from the drug toxicity of the substances
ingested by his mother just prior to his birth.54
Samantha Flute was indicted on March 15, 2017 on one count of
involuntary manslaughter committed by an Indian in Indian country. 55 As
previously discussed, this charge was subject to the jurisdiction of the
federal government under the Major Crimes Act. 56 The indictment claimed
Flute “unlawfully kill[ed] Baby . . . Flute by ingesting prescribed and overthe-counter medicines in a grossly negligent manner, and did thereby
commit the crime of involuntary manslaughter.”57 Following the
indictment, Flute filed a motion to dismiss, arguing her actions did not fit
the conduct of the offense under the FIMA; she argued that an unborn child
does not meet the “human being” requirement and that the Act was
unconstitutionally vague.58
The District Court for the District of South Dakota granted Flute’s
motion to dismiss on the basis that she was not within the class of
defendants the FIMA sought to criminalize. 59 More specifically, the court
found through statutory interpretation that the FIMA was not applicable to a
woman and her unborn child.60 The prosecution appealed this dismissal,
arguing the district court’s statutory interpretation of the FIMA was
incorrect; to the district court’s understanding, the FIMA does, in fact,
apply to women who injure their child in utero causing the child’s death
after birth.61
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered two separate issues. The first
issue was whether babies who die shortly after birth due to injuries
sustained while they were in utero—such as Baby Flute—are included in
the class of victims the FIMA seeks to protect. 62 The court also considered
whether mothers who cause the death of their child after birth through
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Redacted Indictment, supra note 9.
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a); see Flute, 929 F.3d at 586–87.
Redacted Indictment, supra note 9.
Flute, 929 F.3d at 586 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a)).
Id.
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id.
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negligent actions during pregnancy are within the class of defendants under
FIMA.63
Regarding the first issue, the Eighth Circuit determined that babies such
as Baby Flute are within the class of victims recognized under the FIMA. 64
In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit conducted a statutory
interpretation analysis to determine what class of victims the Act was
intended to protect.65 The Eighth Circuit disagreed with Flute’s contention
that the Act did not apply to her because, at the time of her actions that
caused Baby Flute’s later death, Baby Flute was not yet a human being. 66
Citing to the BAIPA, the Eighth Circuit noted that “human being,” as it
relates to any act of Congress, “include[s] every infant member of the
species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development.”67 The
BAIPA defines “born alive” to mean that an infant was completely expelled
or extracted from his or her mother with a beating heart.68 The Eighth
Circuit considered this Act in conjunction with the FIMA, and concluded
that Baby Flute was a human being for purposes of the FIMA.69
Baby Flute survived only hours after his birth before the drugs in his
system caused his death.70 Under the court’s analysis, Baby Flute fit within
the purview of the BAIPA because he was alive following the complete
expulsion from his mother.71 The court reasoned that, because the BAIPA
was created with the intention to apply to all acts of Congress, a born-alive
child whose death is caused after birth by in utero injuries falls within the
victims protected by the FIMA.72
The court noted that this interpretation of the FIMA was consistent with
the common law “born alive” rule, “whereby liability extend[s] to the death
of a child born alive related to injuries received in utero.”73 The court only
considered whether Baby Flute was a human being at the time of death
when considering the application of the FIMA.74 “[H]omicide does not

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 587–88.
Id.
Id. at 588 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 8 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id.; see also infra note 112 and accompanying text.
Flute, 929 F.3d at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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occur unless and until the victim actually dies.” 75 “[B]ecause death
completes the offense of manslaughter, the victim’s status at death” is the
most important factor to consider, “rather than the victim’s status when the
injuries were sustained.”76 Given that Baby Flute was considered a “human
being” at the time of his death, and even if the injuries which caused death
occurred prior to his birth, he and similar victims fall within the protection
of the FIMA according to the Eighth Circuit.77
On the second issue—whether Flute falls within the class of defendants
referenced in the FIMA—the Eighth Circuit found that the mother of a
child who is born alive but then subsequently dies due to the mother’s
negligent conduct while the child was in utero is criminally culpable under
the Act.78 Although the district court originally found that conduct such as
Flute’s was excluded from the FIMA due to an exception for mothers of
unborn children, the Eighth Circuit disagreed. 79 The district court based this
exception on the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, which “criminalizes the
killing or injuring of unborn children during the commission of certain
federal offenses.”80 The Unborn Victims of Violence Act creates offenses
for people who engage in the enumerated crimes, including involuntary
manslaughter, that result in the death of “a child, who is in utero at the time
the conduct takes place.”81 This Act does not include conduct committed by
“any woman with respect to her unborn child.” 82 The district court
concluded that the exception provided in the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act was a “clear statement from Congress that the federal assault and
murder statutes cannot be applied to the pregnant woman herself for any
actions she takes with respect to her unborn child.” 83 The Eighth Circuit, on
the other hand, found this interpretation to be erroneous.84
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Unborn Victims of Violence Act’s
exception “has no applicability or reach beyond its own provisions.”85 The
Eighth Circuit found that the plain language of the Unborn Victims of
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 588–89.
78. Id. at 589.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1086 (8th Cir. 2011)).
81. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (internal quotations omitted)).
82. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (internal quotations omitted)).
83. United States v. Flute, No. 1:17-CR-10017-CBK, 2017 WL 5495170, at *3 (D.S.D.
Nov. 14, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019).
84. Flute, 929 F.3d at 589.
85. Id.
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Violence Act made it clear that the exceptions of the statute applied only to
that specific statute and not to any unrelated statutory provisions, such as
the FIMA.86 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit held that Congress did not
intend for the exception for mothers and their conduct affecting their
unborn children found in the Unborn Victims of Violence Act to be applied
broadly to other statutory provisions. 87 The court stated that it “will not read
an exception into a statutory provision where it does not exist.”88 Because
there was no applicable exception found for mothers and their own
children, the court considered no other information in finding that Flute was
within the class of defendants criminalized by the FIMA.89 Additionally,
the Eighth Circuit noted that the district court was erroneous when it based
its holding on “the potential ramifications of applying the federal
involuntary manslaughter statute” in this instance. 90 Since the plain
meaning of the statue answered the issue in contention, the Eighth Circuit
believed no other considerations should play a part in the analysis.91
Based on the plain language of the statute, the Eighth Circuit found that
Flute was “an appropriate defendant within the scope of [the FIMA] and
may be criminally charged for her conduct . . . ultimately resulting in Baby
Flute’s death after birth.”92 According to the Eighth Circuit, federal
involuntary manslaughter includes the killing of “human beings” which, in
light of the BAIPA, includes children who are born alive. 93 Additionally
within this reasoning, the FIMA includes no exception for a mother’s
conduct, criminalizing negligent behavior of mothers that harms their child
in utero and later results in their child’s death. 94

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 589–90.
Id. at 589.
See id. at 590.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. Analysis of the United States v. Flute Decision and Its Implications for
Native American Women
A. Can a Mother’s Prenatal Actions Constitute Federal Involuntary
Manslaughter?
The Flute district court’s interpretation of the FIMA corresponds with
congressional intent for the Act, prior precedent, and policy concerns.
However, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
interpretation and application of the Act. 95 Finding that the plain meaning
of the statute showed no ambiguity nor exceptions for a mother’s actions
toward her child in utero, the Eighth Circuit performed no further statutory
interpretation in holding that Flute’s actions constituted involuntary
manslaughter.96 The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the plain meaning of
the FIMA as applied in these circumstances is not in line with Congress’
intent for the Act; thus, the intent of the drafters should instead be the
controlling interpretation.
There is no discrepancy between the decision of the lower court and
appeals court over whether Baby Flute was considered to be a human being
for the purposes of the Act. Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit
found that, due to the definition of “human being,” Baby Flute fell within
the class of victims that the FIMA sought to protect.97 The courts, however,
did not agree as to whether a mother’s actions taken against her unborn
child qualified her as a defendant that Congress sought to criminalize. 98
In order to ascertain the meaning of a statute, a court may use the canons
of construction as a rule of thumb, but should turn to the first canon of
construction before all others. 99 Thus, in determining the meaning of a
statute, a court should first look at the “language in which the act is
framed.”100 If the language of the act is plain, then “the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” 101 As a general rule, courts
should presume “that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there.” 102 In interpreting a statute, a court should
95. Id. at 589.
96. Id. at 590.
97. United States v. Flute, No. 1:17-CR-10017-CBK, 2017 WL 5495170, at *2 (D.S.D.
Nov. 14, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019); Flute, 929 F.3d at 590.
98. Flute, 2017 WL 5495170, at *4; Flute, 929 F.3d at 590.
99. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
100. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
101. Id.
102. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253–54.
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consider not only the bare meaning of words and phrases but also their
broader meaning within the statutory scheme as a whole. 103 Words in
isolation are not always controlling in light of the statutory construction
because “[a] word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of
its definitional possibilities.”104 Interpretation of the meaning of a statute
depends on the interpretation of the statue as a whole giving value to both
its purpose and context and in light of any informative precedent or
authority. 105
Albeit rare, there are cases where “the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.”106
Interpretations in conflict with the intentions of drafters occur where the
plain meaning creates a conflict with another section of the code, is
contrary to an important state or federal interest, or is contrary to the view
suggested by legislative history.107 In such cases, the intentions of the
drafters, rather than the plain language, “must be controlling.” 108
On its face, the FIMA seems to have an unambiguous plain meaning,
especially in light of the BAIPA. The FIMA defines manslaughter as “the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice.” 109 Further,
manslaughter is considered to be involuntary when the unlawful killing
occurs “[i]n the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony,
or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and
circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.” 110 For the
purposes of federal legislation, a human being is defined to “include
every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any
stage of development.”111 Further, “born alive” means:
the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother . . .
at any stage of development, who after such expulsion or
extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the
103. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 6 (1999) (quoting Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)) (explaining that in statutory interpretation courts
“‘consider not only the bare meaning’ of the critical word or phrase ‘but also its placement
and purpose in the statutory scheme.’”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
107. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 243 (1989).
108. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571; see also Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a).
110. Id.
111. 1 U.S.C. § 8(a).
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umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles . . .
regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a
result of natural or induced labor, cesarean section, or induced
abortion.112
As the Eighth Circuit noted, given the plain meaning of the Act in
conjunction with the definition of “human being,” Flute’s conduct seems to
constitute involuntary manslaughter.113 The court, however, inaccurately
found no conflict between the intention of the FIMA’s drafters and the
literal application of the Act when applied to mothers for their fatal prenatal
actions. The Act is one of the rare cases where the intentions of the drafters,
rather than the plain meaning, should be controlling.
Congress never intended for the Act to apply to mothers for their
prenatal actions, as evidenced by prior precedent, legislative history, and
policy concerns. Prior precedent shows that “the government has never
before charged a mother with manslaughter based on prenatal neglect that
causes the death of [her] child.”114 In addition to the fact that the Act has
never been applied in this way, the legislative history points to an
interpretation alternative to the one that the Eighth Circuit adopted.
Congress passed the BAIPA in 2001 in response to developing case law
allowing partial-birth abortions.115 Through the Act, Congress sought to
protect living infants completely expelled from their mothers.116 For
instance, the legislative history states that this Act would protect an infant
“born alive at a Federal hospital as a result of a failed abortion attempt” so
doctors would be required to treat the born alive infant “as they would treat
a similarly-situated infant who was born as a result of natural labor.”117
History makes clear that Congress intended this Act to protect infants from
criminal conduct after birth, despite the manner or point in development at
which they are born. Applying the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the
BAIPA goes against the intentions of the drafters. The opponents of the Act
foresaw that it would likely be misconstrued by noting that the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated that “[b]ecause the words
‘person, human being, child, and individual’ are used frequently throughout
the United States Code, CBO cannot determine how the new definitions
112. Id. § 8(b).
113. United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2019).
114. Id. at 591 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
115. H.R. REP. NO. 107–186, at 2–3 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 620, 620–
22, 2001 WL 873624.
116. Id. at 12, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 631.
117. Id. at 13, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 632.
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could be interpreted in all situations.” 118 This interpretation of the Eighth
Circuit is exactly what the opponents of the BAIPA feared. The Eight
Circuit applied the Act in a way likely not foreseen by Congress, due to the
expansive application of the Act to all federal law. The BAIPA was
directed at criminal conduct after birth. The Eight Circuit’s interpretation of
this Act, however, inappropriately expanded it to cover criminal conduct
before birth.
The legislative history of a subsequent act makes clear that Congress has
no intention for the FIMA to apply to a mother’s action against her child in
utero. Two years after the enactment of the BAIPA, the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act was passed. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act further
clarified that Congress never intended the BAIPA to apply to actions
against an infant in utero. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act criminalizes
anyone who “engage[d] in conduct that violate[d] any of the provisions of
law listed in subsection (b) and thereby cause[d] the death of, or bodily
injury . . . to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct t[ook]
place . . . .”119 Involuntary manslaughter is one of the specific offenses
listed in subsection (b) of the Act, but it explicitly states that it should not
be construed to “permit the prosecution . . . of any woman with respect to
her unborn child.”120 Additionally, legislative history notes that the Act
sought to abolish the now-medically unnecessary born alive rule.121 The Act
instead “ensures that Federal prosecutors are able to punish those who
injure or kill unborn children during the commission of violent Federal
crimes, whether or not the child is fortunate enough to survive the attack
and be born alive.”122
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act alone specifically criminalizes acts
against a child in utero. The Act abolished the born alive rule and makes
clear that Congress did not intend to criminalize the acts of mothers with
respect to their unborn child, even if the language of FIMA and the BAIPA
seemingly point to the contrary. Congress did not foresee the Eighth
Circuit’s interpretation when it broadly applied the new definition of
“human being” to all federal legislation. The Unborn Victims of Violence
Act clearly shows Congress did not intend the BAIPA to apply in the
manner prescribed by the Eighth Circuit.
118. Id. at 16, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 634.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).
120. Id. § 1841(c).
121. H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, pt. 1, at 6–7 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 533,
536–37, 2004 WL 314074.
122. Id. at 7, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 537.
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Finally, policy considerations support the interpretation of the FIMA
adopted by the district court, rather than the Eighth Circuit. Although policy
considerations should not be the driving factor of statutory interpretation, 123
they may be considered if they point to ways in which the plain meaning of
the statute is inconsistent with the intent of the drafters. 124 The
interpretation of the Eighth Circuit would allow women to be prosecuted
under the FIMA for many different actions when those actions cause the
prenatal harm and later death of their “born alive” infant.125 Under the
Eighth Circuit’s interpretation, a pregnant woman who caused a car
accident through negligent driving, “use[d] chemotherapy to treat cancer,”
or neglected prenatal care that resulted in the injury or death of her unborn
child, could all likely be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter.126 There
is no evidence that Congress intended any such instances to be considered
involuntary manslaughter; to apply the Act this broadly would start down a
“very slippery slope.”127
Congress never intended for the FIMA to be extended to criminalize the
prenatal actions of a pregnant woman that cause the death of her child, even
if that child is born alive. The strict reading of the FIMA and the BAIPA
goes against Congress’ intent, as evidenced by legislative history and
subsequent acts. In addition, it goes against precedent as this is a conviction
of first impression at the federal level. Lastly, the Eighth Circuit’s strict
reading goes against policy as it would have sweeping adverse effects on
pregnant women; one distinct policy consideration reflected in the
particular facts of Flute is that the interpretation adopted by the Eighth
Circuit will have a disproportionate effect on Native American women.
Because of the many unfortunate circumstances Native American women
are disproportionately exposed to, they will also be more likely to find
themselves in Flute’s position.
123. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963) (“[C]ourts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to
pass laws . . . . We refuse to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation . . . .”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
124. Cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242–43 (1989) (holding that
because there was no evidence of contradictory legislation, contradictory federal or state
interests, contradictory legislative history, nor compelling policy reasons of the statute at
hand, the statute must be interpreted strictly by the language rather than the intentions of the
drafters.).
125. See United States v. Flute, No. 1:17-CR-10017-CBK, 2017 WL 5495170, at *3
(D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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B. The Disproportionate Effects of the Flute Decision on Native American
Women
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Unites States v. Flute will
disproportionately affect Native American women. Native American
women are exposed to limited access to women’s healthcare, heightened
rates of addiction, and infant mortality at a much higher rate than nonIndian women. 128 These conditions make it more likely that a Native
American woman would be adversely affected by the holding. Particularly,
Native American women struggling with addiction, like Samantha Flute,
may face criminal prosecution under the FIMA more frequently than nonIndian women due to the unavailability of abortion services within the
Indian Health Service, caused by the Hyde Amendment.
Many Native Americans view healthcare provided by the United States
as a right created by treaties rather than a privilege. 129 Healthcare, through
the Indian Health Service, was a stipulation in many of the treaties by
which the United States took land from Native Americans. 130 Due to the
high rate of poverty in Native American communities, private healthcare is
rare.131 Thus, the Indian Health Service is the primary healthcare provider
for most Native Americans.132 Despite this service, Native Americans
experience low access rates to adequate healthcare. 133 Native American
women, in particular, do not have access to reproductive healthcare services
that are available to most of the American population. These inaccessible
128. Brief for National Advocates for Pregnant Women & Other Experts in Medicine,
Public Health & Policy as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for
Rehearing En Banc at 19, United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019) (No. 173727), 2019 WL 4132202, at *12 [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (“Native people are
disproportionately impacted by poverty, lack access to adequate healthcare and have much
higher rates of infant mortality . . . .”); Fusselman, supra note 25, at 407 (explaining the
shortage of health professionals on reservations and the Indian Health Service’s failure to
“adequately address the health needs of local Native Americans.”); id. at 406 (“Nearly
nineteen percent of Native Americans ages twelve and older reported using illegal drugs
compared to just under twelve percent of the general U.S. population.”).
129. Leslie Logan, Abortion: Native Women Respond to Onslaught of Laws and
Restrictions Across the Country, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (June 3, 2019),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/abortion-native-women-respond-toonslaught-of-laws-and-restrictions-across-the-country-V0qDwW-tZ0mY1q3KZozxAw.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 407 (explaining the shortage of health professionals on
reservations and the Indian Health Service’s failure to “adequately address the health needs
of local Native Americans”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

208

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

reproductive services include “access to . . . abortion[s], emergency
contraception, and sometimes even condoms.” 134
After the Hyde Amendment was applied to the Indian Health Service,
Native American women could no longer receive abortions in this setting
unless their health was in danger.135 “The law’s impact is particularly
devastating to poor women and discriminates against women who often
need [these] abortion services the most: those who have reduced access to
family planning, and experience higher rates of sexual victimization.” 136
Although the Hyde Amendment applies broadly to all federally funded
healthcare, it disproportionately affects Native American women; federally
funded healthcare through the Indian Health Service is often their only
access to healthcare.137
Even with permissible abortions under the Hyde Amendment, such as
when the mother’s health is in danger or in cases where the pregnancy was
caused by rape or incest, Native American women often are not given
abortion services that could be legally provided by the Indian Health
Service. 138 A survey of Indian Health Service units showed that,
specifically in cases where the mother’s health was “endangered by the
pregnancy,” 62% of the units surveyed “do not provide either abortion
services or funding.”139 In Flute’s home state of South Dakota, a 2003
report stated that it was difficult for a woman to obtain abortion services
outside of the Indian healthcare system. 140 At the time of the report, there
was only one private abortion clinic in South Dakota.141 Because of the
Hyde Amendment and inadequate healthcare provided by the Indian Health
Service, Native American women are less likely to get the reproductive
healthcare treatment they need.
134. Logan, supra note 129.
135. Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill, Pub. L. No. 94–439, sec. 209, 90
Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976); Act of Oct. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-369, sec. 110, 94 Stat. 1351,
1356 (providing continuing appropriations for the fiscal year of 1981).
136. Logan, supra note 129.
137. Id.
138. KATI SCHINDLER ET AL., NATIVE AM. WOMEN’S HEALTH EDUC. RES. CTR.,
INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE AND ITS
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE HYDE AMENDMENT 5 (2002), http://prochoice.org/
pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/indigenous_women.pdf (“[S]urvey
findings showed that 85% of the surveyed Service Units were noncompliant with the official
IHS abortion policy and thus in violation of the Hyde Amendment.”).
139. Id.
140. Logan, supra note 129.
141. Id.
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Most likely due to the inadequacy of reproductive healthcare on
reservations, Native American women are “more likely to experience . . .
neonatal loss.”142 Native American women face a much higher rate of infant
mortality—“9.4 per 1,000 live births”—compared “to the overall national
[infant mortality] rate of 5.8” per 1000 live births. 143 Although the cause of
infant mortality may vary, these high rates are yet another factor that makes
it more likely that Native American women will be disproportionately
affected by the Flute holding.
In addition to having low access to adequate healthcare, Native
Americans face a higher rate of drug addiction than the population at
large.144 A 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health report found that
17.5% of American Indians and Alaskan Natives were in need of alcohol or
illicit drug use treatment, compared to only 9.3% for other races and
ethnicities. 145 Additionally, data collected by the Indian Health Service
reported that, in 2009, the death rate of American Indians and Alaskan
Natives for drug-related deaths was 22.7%.146 This number is compared to a
drastically smaller number of drug-related death rates of all races—
12.6%—in the United States.147 Even in the face of addiction, Native
American women do not have access to abortions because of the Hyde
Amendment. Native American women who suffer with addiction, much
like Flute, have little to no option other than to carry their pregnancy to
term and increase the likelihood that they will be subject to prosecution
under the FIMA as a result of the Flute decision.

142. Amicus Brief, supra note 128.
143. Id. (citing Infant Mortality, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/infantmortality.htm (Sept. 10,
2020)).
144. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 406 (“Nearly nineteen percent of Native Americans
ages twelve and older reported using illegal drugs compared to just under twelve percent of
the general U.S. population.”)
145. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., Need for and Receipt of
Substance Use Treatment Among American Indians or Alaska Natives, NSDUH REPORT,
Nov. 2012, https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH120/NSDUH120/SR
120-treatment-need-AIAN.htm.
146. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH 192
(2014 ed.), https://www.ihs.gov/sites/dps/themes/responsive2017/display_objects/docu
ments/Trends2014Book508.pdf.
147. Id.
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V. Conclusion
The Eighth Circuit’s extension of the FIMA—to include the negligent
actions of pregnant mothers where those actions later caused the death of
their “born alive” child—is inconsistent with Congress’ intentions for the
Act. The Eighth Circuit turned a blind eye to both Congress’ intentions of
the FIMA that were at odds with its reading of the FIMA and to the drastic
implications of its decision.
The Eighth Circuit erroneously ignored the broad consequences the
holding will have on women. Although policy considerations cannot be the
driving force in interpretation, the Eighth Circuit refused to consider the
implication of its holding at all. The holding in United States v. Flute puts
many women at risk for prosecution for negligent actions. But, in particular,
the holding will disproportionately affect Native American women because
of the conditions they are inherently exposed to. Native American women
already face inadequate and meager women’s reproductive healthcare, high
rates of addiction, and high rates of infant mortality. If the FIMA is applied
in accordance with the Eighth Circuit’s holding throughout the country,
many women will face prosecutions for actions that have not previously
been criminalized.
The Flute decision increases the many barriers that women face because
of their reproductive health. These barriers are even greater for Native
American women who have experienced deep-rooted oppression. This
oppression contributes to the disproportionate effect of the Flute decision
on Native American women and the oppressions are further solidified by
the decision itself. This oppression is something that neither society nor the
courts and legislature should support.
United States v. Flute is more than just an incorrectly decided case. It
jeopardizes the future of all women—especially Native American women.
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